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ARTICLES
Are State Courts Enforcing the Fourth
Amendment? A Preliminary Study
CRAIG M. BRADLEY*
INTRODUCTION
In its 1976 decision in Stone v. Powell, I the Supreme Court withdrew juris-
diction from the lower federal courts to entertain habeas corpus petitions
from prisoners who alleged that they had been convicted on the basis of evi-
dence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.2 The Court noted that
"Fourth Amendment violations... do not impugn the integrity of the fact
finding process."' 3 It then reasoned that the purpose of the exclusionary rule
was deterrence and that there is no
reason to assume that any specific disincentive already created by the risk
of exclusion of evidence at trial or the reversal of convictions on direct
review would be enhanced if there were the further risk that a conviction
obtained in state court and affirmed on direct review might be overturned
in collateral proceedings often occurring years after the incarceration of the
defendant.4
That is, applying the sort of economic analysis that the Court has consist-
* Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington) School of Law. A.B. 1967, University of
North Carolina; J.D. 1970, University of Virginia. The author wishes to thank Professor Tom
Schornhorst, who planted the seed for this research, and Professors Yale Kamisar and Tom Davies,
as well as the faculty forums at Indiana and Texas law schools, for their helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this article. Special thanks also to Dean Paul Marcus and law student Dan Larson
of the University of Arizona and Professor Tim Flanagan of the University of South Carolina for
research assistance in their respective states.
1. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
2. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
Withdrawal of federal jurisdiction is subject to one exception: "a showing that the state prisoner
was denied an opportunity for a full and fair litigation of that claim at trial and on direct review."
Stone, 428 U.S. at 495 n.37; see also id. at 482, 494 (holding that federal habeas corpus relief not
required when state law has provided opportunity for full and fair litigation of fourth amendment
claim). This exception is discussed infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
3. Stone, 428 U.S. at 479.
4. Id. at 493.
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ently invoked in its criminal procedure decisions in recent years, 5 the cost of
federal habeas-interfering with the finality of state convictions-is not
worth the benefit-furthering the deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule.6
The Court dismissed as unfounded the argument that "state courts can't be
trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values."' 7
This streamlining of federal habeas jurisdiction has met with some disa-
greement. In his dissent, Justice Brennan countered that "the availability of
collateral remedies is necessary to insure the integrity of proceedings at and
before trial where constitutional rights are at stake."'8 While Justice Brennan
did not say so flatly, the thrust of his opinion was that after Stone the
states-subject only to inadequate Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction-
could not in fact be trusted to enforce the fourth amendment.9
Academic critics were no less distressed by the Stone decision. As Profes-
sor Seidman stated: "By closing the only effective federal forum for raising
fourth amendment claims, [Stone] turns the exclusionary rule into little more
than a precatory suggestion to state courts . . ... -" Similarly, Professor
Michael opined that the holding in Stone created the danger of a return to an
5. See id, at 489-91 (weighing costs and utility of exclusionary rule); see also United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-08 (1984) (court must weigh costs and benefits of exclusionary rule before
excluding evidence).
6. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 495 n.37 ("we emphasize the minimum utility of the rule when sought
to be applied to Fourth Amendment claims in a habeas corpus proceeding").
7. Id at 493-94 n.35 ("Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic
attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state judges in years past, we are unwilling to
assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the
trial and appellate courts of the several states.").
8. Id at 519 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 225
(1969)). Justice Brennan continued: "[HIabeas jurisdiction is a deterrent to unconstitutional ac-
tions by trial and appellate judges, and a safeguard to ensure that rights secured under the Constitu-
tion and federal laws are not merely honored in the breach." Id. at 521.
9. See id. at 526 ("The Court does not.., dispute that institutional constraints totally preclude
any possibility that this Court can adequately oversee whether state courts have properly applied
federal law . . ").
10. Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in
Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 436, 450 (1980). Other commentators have been con-
cerned that Stone would be extended to apply to any constitutional violation, even those that affect
guilt or innocence. See Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism, Habeas Corpus and the Court,
86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1087 (1977) (Stone "may be deepened and widened until the guilt/innocence
theory ... serves as the principal doctrine for restricting existing rights and creating new ones").
However, despite the fact that this expansion would seem to follow from the Stone opinion, it has
not occurred. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979) (refusing to extend Stone to
claim of grand jury discrimination); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382-83 (1986) (re-
jecting extension of Stone to sixth amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims); cf
Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MIcH. L. REv. 865, 888-91 (1981) (Stone should not be
extended to habeas claims of Miranda and sixth amendment Massiah violations); Halpern, Federal
Habeas Corpus and Mapp Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 39-41
(1982) (Stone should not be extended to habeas claims of Miranda violations).
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era of "flagrant disregard of the prohibition against illegal searches."" l Pro-
fessor Israel, on the other hand, was more sanguine, arguing that
It seems most unlikely... that the Stone decision will encourage many
state trial courts to violate the fourth amendment. The limited number of
federal habeas reversals of state convictions suggests that a state trial judge
with an inclination to ignore the fourth amendment is likely to be con-
cerned primarily with reversal by a state appellate court, not a federal
habeas court.12
Both the majority and the dissent in Stone, and their respective academic
supporters, rest their views of Stone's wisdom on untested assumptions. As
Professor Halpern has observed: "There are no data on the pivotal issue: is
federal collateral review necessary to ensure adequate state court enforce-
ment of the exclusionary rule?" 13 Despite Professor Halpern's insightful rec-
ognition of the problem, neither he nor anyone else has endeavored to collect
such data. This article is a preliminary attempt to fill this gap-to discover
whether the state courts are, in fact, enforcing the fourth amendment and
whether the Stone decision has had any impact on such enforcement.
As will be discussed in detail later in this article, the results are mixed.
Most states are doing a fairly good job, 14 some states a poor job, and some,
deciding most cases by unreported opinions, are hard to evaluate. The re-
sults also show that Stone appears to have had little impact on state compli-
ance with fourth amendment rules.
While originally I had intended only to determine Stone's impact and
whether the state courts were enforcing the fourth amendment, the data led
me to a more profound observation. As Table I shows, 26% of the 1986
cases studied were, or should have been, decided for the defendant under the
Supreme Court's fourth amendment "rules." Yet, in view of the Court's
often vague guidance concerning fourth amendment rules,15 most of these
cases do not appear to be the result of purposeful or reckless police misbe-
havior, but instead arguably could be construed as understandable
11. Michael, The "New" Federalism and the Burger Court's Deference to the States in Federal
Habeas Proceedings, 64 IowA L. REv. 233, 255 (1979).
12. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH.
L. REV. 1319, 1406-07 (1973). Israel pointed out that fewer than 5% of the cases presented to
federal courts on habeas corpus resulted in reversal. Id. at 1407 n.370.
13. Halpern, supra note 10, at 13. As Justice Powell observed, the "Court should not assume
that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the rights of defendants will continue."
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 65 (1972).
14. By "good job," I mean conscientious application of the complicated rules that the Supreme
Court has developed in the years since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15. See Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985)
(describing confusion wrought by multitude of Supreme Court pronouncements on fourth amend-
ment rules).
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mistakes.1 6
The rules do not appear to capture the essence of the fourth amendment.
They are either too strict, too complex, or both. 17 This is true, whether one
takes the position that the "essence" of the fourth amendment is embodied in
the reasonableness clause or the warrant clause.18 The Supreme Court in
recent years has paid lip service to the latter while, in practice, frequently
utilizing the former approach, leaving a body of law that is hopelessly
confused. 19
The data compiled show that in 1986 the police failed to follow fourth
amendment law over twenty-five percent of the time and that the appellate
courts misconstrued the amendment about ten percent of the time.20 This is
hardly surprising considering that a four-volume treatise is required to
explain what that law is.21 Virtually all of this law has developed in the
twenty-seven years since Mapp. The problem is likely to get worse as a result
of the Supreme Court's tendency to decide numerous search and seizure
cases22 and the tendency of each decision to create more uncertainty than it
16. Justice Rehnquist has complained about the "mysteries of the Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 520 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Examples
of the difficulty of applying fourth amendment rules abound. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 500 So. 2d
472, 473-74 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (remanded to determine if arrest warrant was issued on purely
conclusory statement that defendant "did feloniously possess" marijuana and cocaine; if so, warrant
not properly obtained); State v. Rice, 717 P.2d 695, 696-97 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (evidence
obtained from "inventory search" of car inadmissible because impoundment had no legal basis
flowing from driving without license and was therefore merely pretext for search); State v. Carpena,
714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (search of trunk lacked probable cause when basis for
stop was that car moved slowly at 3:00 A.M. through area which had experienced rash of
burglaries).
17. There is one exception: consent searches. This broad loophole in fourth amendment law can
swallow up all the other rules. Georgia police in particular seemed adept at using this exception.
See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (noting that in 1986 about 20% of Georgia cases
studied featured consent searches).
18. Justice Rehnquist has focused upon the first clause. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
406 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("The constitutionality of a particular search (or seizure) is a
question of reasonableness and depends on 'a balance between the public interest and the individ-
ual's right to personal security."' (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878
(1975))).
19. The Court claims that for a search to be "reasonable" the police must have a warrant, "sub-
ject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). At last count,
however, there were over 20 such exceptions under which the majority of searches are performed
and which can hardly be called "well-delineated." See Bradley, supra note 15, at 1473-75 (listing
exceptions to warrant requirement).
20. Table I, infra at 258 (223 cases were studied: 58 cases exhibited improper police action and
courts improperly ruled in favor of the government in 23 of these cases).
21. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2d
ed. 1986).
22. From the 1979 through 1983 Terms, the Supreme Court decided 35 cases involving the
fourth amendment.
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resolves. 23 I discuss some proposed solutions to this problem later in this
article.
II. THE STUDY
To answer the questions posed, I began by reading the 1986 "Search and
Seizure" and "Arrest" headnoted cases from three states: Georgia, Idaho,
and Illinois. These states were chosen as, in my view, a reasonable cross-
section of the country, with one caveat. I specifically eliminated from con-
sideration any state which, to my knowledge, has shown an inclination to go
further than the Supreme Court in enforcing fourth amendment rights.
Thus, I assumed24 that Alaska, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin are enforcing at
least the United States Supreme Court's standards because the courts of these
states have surpassed the Supreme Court in protecting defendants against
unreasonable searches and seizures.25
This initial sample showed that Idaho was applying Supreme Court stan-
dards rigorously, Illinois was producing mixed results, and Georgia essen-
tially was not enforcing the fourth amendment.2 6 Since it seemed likely at
this point that many states do comply with the federal standards, I decided
to focus further study on other states with conservative reputations to see if
any others, besides Georgia, were failing to enforce the amendment. Conse-
quently, I studied the 1986 decisions from Alabama, Arizona, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Utah. The results are summarized in Table
I.
Next, to determine whether the Stone decision had affected enforcement or
nonenforcement, I studied a "control" group of 1975 decisions (the last full
23. See generally Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1
(demonstrating that the Court's attempts to achieve certainty often lead to more uncertainty).
24. Since I do not draw conclusions about the country as a whole, it does not matter whether my
assumptions about these states are correct.
25. These states have rejected, under their constitutions, the Supreme Court's narrowing of de-
fendants' rights in cases such as United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-21 (1984) (establishing
good faith exception to exclusionary rule), Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) (establish-
ing totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine probable cause), and New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454,462 (1981) (allowing search of passenger compartment of automobile as search incident to
lawful custodial arrest). The decisions rejecting these Supreme Court opinions are discussed in
Latzer, Limits of the New Federalism: State Court Responses, 14 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 89
(1987). This list does not purport to include all of the states that have enacted rules more protective
of the fourth amendment than the Supreme Court, but it comes close.
Of course, these states might fail to enforce some other aspect of fourth amendment law and
should thus not necessarily be exempt from further study.
26. See Table I, infra (of 13 cases studied, Idaho decided none incorrectly in favor of government
and 4 in favor of defendant; Illinois decided 15.7% of cases studied incorrectly in favor of govern-
ment, but 23.5% of cases in favor of defendant; Georgia decided 17.5% of cases incorrectly in favor
of government and only 3.5% in favor of defendant).
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year of federal habeas jurisdiction) from the same nine states.27 I then deter-
mined the number of reported grants of federal habeas corpus relief on fourth
amendment grounds in the nine states studied in 1975.28
The perceptive reader already will have recognized that this study is not
"scientific." First, as discussed, I made no effort to choose the states ran-
domly. The thrust of this study was not to see whether the states are, in
general, enforcing the fourth amendment. Rather, it was to find out if any
state was not enforcing it and whether that nonenforcement can be attributed
to Stone.
Second, while the compilation of data into tables gives the appearance of
an objective study, and while objectivity was indeed my goal, a degree of
subjectivity was unavoidable. That is, the data depend on my conclusions,
based on my understanding of fourth amendment law, and influenced by my
biases as to whether state cases are correctly decided.29 To allow the reader
to draw his or her own conclusions, I have provided a detailed discussion of
some representative cases later in the article as well as lists of all "wrongly
decided" cases in footnotes. Nevertheless, since nearly four hundred cases
were studied, the tabulated results ultimately depend on my view of the law.
I have, however, tried to be a dispassionate and well-informed observer.
Third, a study of appellate decisions does not tell the full story about
fourth amendment compliance. For example, if police in a particular state
are good at making up "probable cause" or "consents" or if prosecutors are
particularly vigilant at dismissing cases with fourth amendment problems
prior to trial, appellate court statistics may not accurately reflect the level of
fourth amendment compliance "on the street." However, there is no reason
to expect that such matters would change much within a state from 1975 to
1986 or that Stone would have had any impact in that respect.
Moreover, it is highly unlikely, if state appellate decisions reflect less than
vigorous fourth amendment enforcement, that vigorous enforcement never-
theless will be occurring in the trial courts, prosecutors' offices, and police
departments. Also, I counted separately the number of "consent" searches
in each state to try to guard against the opposite possibility: that appellate
decisions give the impression of enforcement although it is not occurring in
practice.30 I could think of no way to guard against police officers lying
about the quantum of probable cause, but in that respect this study is situ-
27. See Table II, infra at 259.
28. See Table III, infra at 260.
29. However I urge United States District Courts, in acting on my proposed solution to the
problem of state noncompliance, to rely not upon my view of the cases, but upon an independent
evaluation. See infra text accompanying notes 171-72.
30. See Davies, Affirmed: A Study of Criminal Appeals and Decision-Making Norms in a Califor-
nia Court of Appeal, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 543, 598-600 (discussing problem of police per-
jury in criminal cases).
[Vol. 77:251
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ated no worse than prosecutors who handle motions to suppress before trial
or studies that examine the exclusionary rule's effectiveness in deterring po-
lice misconduct. Police perjury is simply an imponderable. Still, it is proba-
bly fair to assume that police prevarication is relatively constant both from
state to state and from year to year, in which case it may be factored out.31
The most serious problem with studying appellate decisions is the common
use of unreported decisions, particularly in Arizona and South Carolina.
This problem, and how I attempted to cope with it, is discussed later in this
article.
Fourth, neither the fourth amendment nor the exclusionary rule is the
same as it was in 1976, the year that Stone was decided. The automobile
exception to the warrant requirement has been expanded;32 the standard for
probable cause has been loosened;33 "stop and frisk" has been expanded; 34
and "good faith" has become an exception in search warrant cases. 35 This
trend could have the effect of diluting Stone's apparent impact. That is, as
the fourth amendment becomes "easier" to enforce (i.e., less restrictive on
police), we might expect the states to enforce what is left of it more vigor-
ously. While this point should be kept in mind, it did not in fact appear that
many of the 1986 decisions revolved around these fourth amendment
innovations.
Finally, I offer this data not as conclusive "proof" that a given state is, or
is not, enforcing the fourth amendment, but rather only as evidence of such
compliance or noncompliance. As I suggest, the United States District
Courts in the individual states should draw their own conclusions.
III. INTERPRETING THE STUDY
Table I shows the results in fourth amendment cases for 1986 in the nine
31. But see Note, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcot-
ics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 1016, 1050 (1987) (by M. Orfield, Jr.) (suggesting that increased
warrant use may have diminished incidence of police perjury).
32. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (upholding warrantless search of automo-
bile when police have probable cause); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (allowing
search of passenger compartment as search incident to a lawful arrest).
33. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) (adopting totality-of-the-circumstances test
for probable cause determinations).
34. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985) (imposing no rigid time limitation on
Terry stop); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 233 (1985) (Terry stop allowed when police
have reasonable suspicion that individual is wanted for felony offense); see also Wasserstrom, The
Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 355-75 (1984) (discussion of
fourth amendment as in a state of transition, with weakened warrant and probable cause require-
ments and expanded Terry searches).
35. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (good faith reliance on invalid search
warrant does not violate fourth amendment); see also Kamisar, Comparative Reprehensibility and
the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. Rv. 1, 39-42 (1987) (discussing "inadver-
tent" or honest police blunder exception to exclusionary rule).
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TABLE III
1975 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS-SEARCH AND SEIZURE
CASES REPORTED'
STATE HABEAS CASES DECIDED2  ANY RELIEF GRANTED
GEORGIA 2 0
ILLINOIS 2 1
IDAHO 0 0
SOUTH CAROLINA 1 0
LOUISIANA 1 0
ALABAMA 2 1
OKLAHOMA 3 0
ARIZONA 1 1
UTAH 0 0
TOTAL 13 33
'Westlaw search of "Search and Seizure" and "Arrest" headnoted federal habeas corpus cases,
1975.
2 Includes decisions by United States District Courts and the United States Courts of Appeals.
3 In addition, three other cases headnoted "arrest" or "search and seizure" were decided on other
grounds, two for and one against defendants.
states studied; Table II contains the results for 1975. The percentage figures
shown in each table's last two columns are particularly significant. The per-
centage of decisions favoring the defendant simply shows how often the de-
fendant won. Given the difficulty of understanding fourth amendment law36
and the amendment's incompatibility with zealous law enforcement, one
would expect a substantial number of cases to be decided in the defendant's
favor in a state that is vigorously enforcing the Supreme Court's rules.37 As
the tables show, this statistic has decreased from 20.9% in 1975 to 15.7% in
1986.38
The other important figure, the "percentage of wrong cases for the govern-
36. See Bradley, supra note 15, at 1468 ("The fourth amendment is the Supreme Court's tar
baby: a mass of contradictions and obscurities that has ensnared the 'Brethren' in such a way that
every effort to extract themselves only finds them more profoundly stuck.").
37. Despite the fact that a well-trained police force and good trial courts would, theoretically,
leave no need for prodefendant decisions at the appellate level, my experience as a prosecutor and as
a student of fourth amendment law suggests that the rules are too complicated for any police force
to avoid making mistakes. See Bradley, supra note 15, at 1468-69 (describing difficulty of deci-
phering Supreme Court rules on search and seizure). But see infra text accompanying notes 107-20
(Arizona's low rate of prodefendant appellate decisions may represent good police work by police
force trained to follow fourth amendment rules). In any event, a theoretically perfect state legal
system, while producing no decisions for defendants on appeal, also would produce no wrong deci-
sions for the government.
38. Of course, this trend also might be explained by either improved police procedures or more
prodefendant decisions at the trial level.
260
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ment," shows how often the state courts erred in the government's favor.39
Thus, it shows what percentage of cases might be reversed if federal courts
were reviewing state court fourth amendment decisions carefully. Tables I
and II show that, in the states studied, the cumulative percentage of cases
wrongly decided in favor of the government has increased since Stone from
5.7% in 1975 to 10.3% in 1986. Together, these two statistics suggest that
Stone's withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction has adversely affected state
fourth amendment jurisprudence. Prodefendant decisions have decreased,
and wrong decisions for the government have increased.
But there are reasons to be suspicious of this conclusion. First, there were
very few reversals of state convictions on federal habeas for any reason prior
to Stone.4° More specifically, as Table III shows, in the nine states studied in
1975, I found only thirteen cases of reported federal court scrutiny of defen-
dants' fourth amendment claims, only three of which resulted in relief being
granted on fourth amendment grounds. However, there is reason to believe
that there are substantially more unpublished cases in which relief was
granted.41
Second, while the last column in Tables I and II does show a drop in the
percentage of prodefendant decisions, the 1986 figure of 15.7% would seem
to suggest that, in general, many state courts, even in the relatively conserva-
tive states studied, are still taking fourth amendment claims seriously.42
Moreover, this decrease in prodefendant decisions could simply reflect the
Supreme Court's loosening of fourth amendment standards. However, if this
were the case, there also should have been fewer wrong decisions in favor of
the government, rather than more, as actually occurred.
The most telling of the above factors is the low level of reported federal
court scrutiny of state fourth amendment decisions in 1975.43 Even if the
39. I did not tabulate how often courts erred in the defendant's favor. However, my impression
was that such errors were rare.
40. Israet, supra note 12, at 1407 n.370 (studies conducted in the early 1970s indicated that less
than 5% of habeas petitions presented to federal courts were granted).
41. In an effort to determine how many more unpublished habeas decisions there were, I com-
pared information from the Federal Judicial Center on all habeas.petitions with Westlaw's informa-
tion on reported habeas decisions for the period of July 1, 1978, to June 30, 1979 (the only period
for which the Federal Judicial Center had this data). I found that there were 8,246 state prisoner
habeas petitions in that period of which only 73 (0.9%) resulted in published opinions. Prisoners
were granted some relief in 327 of all cases (4.0%). Only 17 of the 327 cases in which relief was
granted were reported (5.2%). How this figure applies to fourth amendment cases decided in 1975
in the nine states studied is anybody's guess, but it is safe to assume that relief was granted in more
than the three reported cases.
42. But see infra notes 54-105 and accompanying text (discussing evidence that Georgia is not
complying with fourth amendment requirements and that South Carolina and Arizona are hiding
fourth amendment problems by using unpublished opinions).
43. See supra note 41 (only 0.9% of all habeas petitions in 1978-79 resulted in published
opinions).
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total number of reversals was five times the reported number of three, appar-
ently Stone has not relieved the states of a major infringement on their sover-
eignty, as the Court claimed, 44 nor has it saved society from the release of
numerous criminals on fourth amendment "technicalities." If this is true,
Stone could only have produced two effects. First, Stone may have relieved
state courts of the potential threat of reversal in federal court, which might
have caused them to "toe the line" in enforcing the fourth amendment. It
seems unlikely, however, that state courts would have been affected by this
potential threat of federal intervention when surely they were aware of the
actuality of nonintervention. This threat may have checked any tendency
toward blatant violations, but blatant violations did not occur in 1986 after
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction was abandoned. 45
Second, Stone may have relieved the federal courts of the burden of deal-
ing with a great many habeas corpus petitions by prisoners alleging fourth
amendment violations. In fact, while there are no statistics as to the number
of such petitions, the total number of habeas petitions filed in federal courts
on all issues.remained roughly constant from 1975 to 1976 and had increased
by about twenty-seven percent as of 1986.46 Of course, nothing in Stone pre-
vents a prisoner from filing a petition raising fourth amendment issues; it
simply makes such petitions easy to deny. Thus Stone, if not reducing the
number of habeas petitions, undoubtedly made it easier for the federal courts
to dispose of them. This benefit, however, seems insignificant if one expects
the federal courts to provide a bulwark against wholesale violations of fourth
amendment rights by the states.
An examination of the data for individual states also suggests that Stone
has not had as great an impact as its detractors once feared. In this nine-
state survey, most of the increase in decisions that wrongly favored the gov-
ernment and decrease in decisions favoring the defendant can be attributed to
one state: Georgia. In 1975, of the nine states studied, Georgia was the most
responsive to defendants' fourth amendment claims, deciding 45.7% of stud-
44. The Court found:
Resort to habeas corpus... results in serious intrusions on values important to our system
of government [including] . . . "(ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials, (iii) the
minimization of friction between our federal and state systems of justice, and (iv) the
maintenance of the constitutional balance on which the doctrine of federalism is
founded."
Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 n.31 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell,
J., concurring)).
45. See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text (few of the 223 cases studied from 1986 in-
volved police behavior that was clearly wrong).
46. There were 7,843 habeas petitions filed by state petitioners in 1975, 7,833 in 1976, and 10,724
in 1986. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTs 189 (1976); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS 176 (1986).
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ied cases for defendants and deciding no cases wrongly for the government. 47
By stark contrast, in 1986 Georgia had become the least responsive of the
sampled states to such claims, deciding only 3.5% of all fourth amendment
cases in favor of defendants and 17.5% wrongly in favor of the govern-
ment.48 Eliminating Georgia from the study shifts the results dramatically.
In that case, only 13.8% of the cases studied in 1975 would have been de-
cided in favor of defendants, with that figure increasing to 19.8% in 1986.
Similarly, the number of cases wrongly decided in favor of the government
would increase only slightly, from 7.3% in 1975 to 7.9% in 1986. These
statistics suggest that Stone had little impact on the eight remaining states.
It seems unlikely that Stone had such a tremendous impact on Georgia but
little effect on the other eight states. A much more likely explanation would
focus on political/social factors peculiar to Georgia. Without attempting a
detailed social analysis of that state, two possible explanations come to mind.
In 1975, the liberal Democrat Jimmy Carter had recently completed his term
as Governor of Georgia. Presumably, he made judicial appointments com-
mensurate with his philosophy, which are reflected in the 1975 decisions.
The 1986 bench, on the other hand, may reflect more conservative appoint-
ments.49 A second explanation may be that most of the 1986 cases involved
narcotics. Georgia borders Florida, the site of substantial drug traffic in re-
cent years. As a result of federal law enforcement efforts aimed at Florida,
Georgia has itself experienced substantial drug activity.50 It may be that
Georgia courts were particularly unresponsive to fourth amendment claims
in 1986 because so many of them were raised by drug traffickers.51
Alabama presents additional evidence of politics playing as large, if not a
larger, role than Stone in changing a state's attitude about the fourth amend-
ment. In 1975 during George Wallace's governorship, Alabama had a ques-
tionable record, deciding only 3.9% of studied cases in favor of defendants
47. Table II, supra. While Idaho actually had a greater percentage of cases decided in favor of
defendants than Georgia, this statistic is misleading because Idaho reported only two cases. Id.
48. Id. These figures disclose a shocking fact: while 21.0% of the total cases should have been
decided in favor of the defendant, only 3.5% actually were, meaning that 83.3% of the cases that
defendants should have won were wrongly decided.
49. Carter appointed five justices to the seven-member Georgia Supreme Court, only one of
whom was still on the Court in 1986. Compare 228 Ga. iii (1971) and 234 Ga. iii (1975) (addition of
five Georgia Supreme Court Justices in period 1971-75) with 255 Ga. iii (1986) (only Hon. Harold
N. Hill, Jr. remaining from 1975 court).
50. See Shenon, The Enemy Within: Drug Money is Corrupting the Enforcers, N.Y. Times, Apr.
11, 1988, at Al, col. 6, A12, col. 2 (reporting that, beginning in 1981, southern Georgia had become
popular among drug smugglers as a result of federal crackdowns on drug shipments to Florida).
51. As Professor Saltzburg has observed, courts have been "turning their backs" on fourth
amendment principles "in order to aid the war against illicit drugs." Saltzburg, Another View of
Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (As illustrated by the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. Prlr.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1986).
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and 19.2% wrongly in favor of the government. 52 By 1986, however, despite
Stone, Alabama had changed dramatically, deciding 23.0% of all cases stud-
ied in favor of the defendant and no cases wrongly for the government. Like
Georgia, it would appear that Alabama's courts were influenced not by the
United States Supreme Court but by internal political and social considera-
tions that affected societal attitudes, police training, judicial appointments,
and other relevant matters.5 3
To argue, as I have, that Stone has not generally diminished state compli-
ance with the fourth amendment does not answer the question posed in this
article's title: Are the state courts enforcing the fourth amendment? While
readers may disagree as to whether the overall rate-10.3% of cases decided
wrongly in favor of the government and 15.7% of cases decided in favor of
the defendant-represents substantial compliance, the study indicates that at
least one and possibly three states of the nine studied simply are not enforc-
ing the amendment: Georgia, South Carolina, and Arizona.
Georgia presents an easy case for noncompliance. It is virtually impossible
for a defendant to win a fourth amendment claim in the appellate courts of
that state.5 4 Of fifty-seven cases in which defendants raised fourth amend-
ment issues, only two cases were decided in favor of the defendant.5 5 These
two cases involved a first-offense possession of marijuana 56 and a murder in
which the state conceded that there was no probable cause for arrest and the
trial court already had suppressed the resulting statements by the
defendant.57
The difficulty that defendants apparently have in Georgia can be illus-
trated by examining several of the "wrongly decided" cases. In Isbell v.
State, 58 for example, the defendant shot and killed a juvenile who was bur-
glarizing his apartment. He had his neighbor call the police; he disassembled
the gun; and when the police arrived he explained what had happened.5 9
The police obtained a search warrant for the apartment, searched it four
52. Table II, supra.
53. As Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson once observed, "Criminal rights... may... be the part of the
[Supreme] Court's work most susceptible to swings of the pendulum after a change in personnel."
J. WILKINSON, SERVING JUSTICE 146 (1974). The same is presumably true of state supreme court
attitudes toward criminal rights.
54. This statement is true of reported opinions. Georgia also has a substantial number of unre-
ported opinions pursuant to GA. Sup. CT. R. 59.
55. Table I, supra.
56. Vincent v. State, 178 Ga. App. 199, 201, 342 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1986) (conviction reversed
because based on evidence seized by police officer with neither probable cause nor arrest warrant).
57. State v. Harris, 256 Ga. 24, 26, 343 S.E.2d 483, 485 (1986) (affirming suppression of incrimi-
nating statement made during an interrogation that was conducted following an arrest lacking prob-
able cause).
58. 179 Ga. App. 363, 346 S.E.2d 857, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1098 (1986).
59. Id. at 364-65, 346 S.E.2d at 858-59.
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hours after the shooting, and found marijuana and cocaine in plain view.
The appellate court found no probable cause for a search warrant beyond the
fact of the shooting but, citing Mincey v. Arizona,60 noted that the police
"were authorized" in making a warrantless search of the apartment "in order
to secure the crime scene."' 61 It followed that the search warrant, obtained
by the officers in "an abundance of caution" 62 was justified; the appellate
court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.
The facts of this case square almost exactly with those of Mincey in which
the United States Supreme Court specifically rejected any such crime scene
exception to the warrant and (by implication) probable cause requirements.6 3
In Isbell the police already had discovered the gun and "observed evidence of
an apparent burglary" when they responded to the defendant's call.6" More-
over, the defendant had already given a full statement admitting the shoot-
ing.65 There was no probable cause for a search warrant because there was
no evidence to find, and no "crime scene exception" has been recognized by
the Supreme Court as dispensing with the probable cause and warrant
requirements. 66
In another wrongly decided case, Minor v. State, 67 a police officer stopped
the defendant's van for an illegal left turn at 2:30 A.M. in a warehouse area of
Savannah. The defendant produced citation papers showing that his driver's
license had been revoked.6 8 When asked what he was doing there, the de-
fendant stated that he had been cleaning one of the warehouses, but the of-
ficer could see no cleaning equipment in the van. 69 In addition, the
defendant and the passenger told conflicting stories about who owned the
60. 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978) (dictum) (warrantless search permissible when conducted with
reasonable belief that person is in need of immediate aid).
61. Isbel, 179 Ga. App. at 365, 346 S.E.2d at 859.
62. Id. at 366, 346 S.E.2d at 859.
63. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395 (warrantless search of apartment pursuant to "murder scene excep-
tion" created by Arizona Supreme Court violates fourth amendment); see also Thompson v. Louisi-
ana, 469 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1984) (warrantless search of murder scene violates the fourth amendment);
cf Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293 (1984) (requiring search warrant based on probable
cause for reentry into arson scene after fire has been extinguished).
64. 179 Ga. App. at 365, 346 S.E.2d at 859.
65. Id. at 364-65, 346 S.E.2d at 858-59.
66. Had the court held that, though the search warrant in this case was defective, the evidence
nevertheless was admissible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), Isbell would have been a closer case. However, I doubt that a warrant
affidavit, which apparently was completely lacking in probable cause, would qualify under Leon.
While this situation did not present itself in any other case, I would not have counted a case as
"wrong," even if the reasoning was incorrect, if I could think of a satisfactory rationale to support
the result.
67. 180 Ga. App. 869, 350 S.E.2d 783 (1986).
68. Id. at 869, 350 S.E.2d at 784.
69. Id. at 869-70, 350 S.E.2d at 784.
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van.70 The officer advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and took him
to the warehouse where the defendant opened the combination lock to the
gate, "thus convincing the officer that [he] had worked there or at least knew
how to get in."' 71 The officer also received word that the defendant's brother
owned the van as defendant had claimed. The officer had no knowledge of a
specific burglary, but he "'knew within [himself]' that some place had been
burglarized. '72 Accordingly, he formally arrested the defendant and
searched the van incident to the arrest, finding property later determined to
have been stolen from the warehouse in question. 73 While the officer cannot
be faulted too severely for this alert police work, it seems inescapable that
neither the original detention nor the formal arrest were justified by probable
cause. Consequently, the evidence should have been suppressed.
In Gravley v. State74 police received a "tip" that the defendant was grow-
ing marijuana at his farm. They went to the farm "to talk to him."' 75 Look-
ing for the defendant, the police walked through a barn to a vegetable garden
where they saw marijuana plants. Although the court conceded that the
barn and the garden were within the curtilage of the house,76 it held that "no
rational person can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an open area
such as a yard or a garden even in the curtilage."' 77 As the dissent correctly
pointed out, the Supreme Court in Oliver v. United States78 did not extend
the "open fields" doctrine to the curtilage.79 Assuming that individuals have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a yard or garden within the curtilage
of the house, it was improper for the police to search that area to find some-
one for questioning.80
In Kennard v. State,81 another wrongly decided Georgia case, a search
warrant was issued for a knife suspected to have been used in an armed rape.
The affidavit stated that within the preceding two days a rape had been inves-
tigated, that appellant had been arrested at his home, and that the police
therefore believed that the knife would be at his home. 82 The appeals court
70. Id. at 870, 350 S.E.2d at 784.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 872, 350 S.E.2d at 785-86.
74. 181 Ga. App. 400, 352 S.E.2d 589 (1986).
75. Id. at 401, 352 S.E.2d at 591.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 403, 352 S.E.2d at 593.
78. 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
79. Gravley, 181 Ga. App. at 408, 352 S.E.2d at 596 (Sognier, J., with Banke, C.J. & Benham, J.,
dissenting).
80. Cf United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 303 (1987) (Court assumed arguendo that barn
could not be entered without warrant).
81. 180 Ga. App. 522, 349 S.E.2d 470 (1986).
82. Id. at 523, 349 S.E.2d at 472.
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does not explicitly state what evidence was actually found. Assuming there
was probable cause to believe that appellant had committed the rape two
days before, that fact alone does not, in my view, render it in any way prob-
able that the appellant would have taken the knife home and kept it there for
that period. Accordingly, I judged this case wrongly decided.
When in doubt, I classified cases in the state's favor. For example, I
counted the following decision as correct, though many would probably con-
sider it wrongly decided. In Cline v. State83 the police obtained a search
warrant for a house at which the defendant was staying. The warrant was
based on an affidavit describing a narcotics buy that had occurred more than
two months earlier.84 However, the issuing magistrate testified that the po-
lice officer had informed him orally of subsequent surveillance indicating that
"drug traffic was still going on."' 85 Without this oral information, the prob-
able cause was stale. Therefore, the issue was whether oral statements may
be given to supplement written affidavits. Professor LaFave supports the
view that a defective affidavit should not be saved by oral testimony. 86 How-
ever, he points out that the Supreme Court has "never explicitly passed on
this issue" and that the prevailing view is to allow such testimony.87 Accord-
ingly, giving the benefit of the doubt to the state courts, as was my practice, I
did not count this as a "wrong" decision.
None of the Georgia cases involves approval of blatant police miscon-
duct.88 What is striking is that defendants virtually never win, despite the
21% of cases in which the police failed to comply with the fourth amend-
ment. Another feature of the Georgia cases, which suggests that fourth
amendment violations may be even more widespread than reflected by the
appellate statistics, is the number of consents. Eleven of the fifty-seven 1986
83. 178 Ga. App. 470, 343 S.E.2d 506 (1986).
84. Id. at 471, 343 S.E.2d at 508.
85. Id. at 472, 343 S.E.2d at 508.
86. 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 4.3(b), at 172-74 (describing insufficiency of oral testimony
when no contemporaneous written record of testimony exists).
87. Id. at 171-72.
88. The other 1986 Georgia cases wrongly decided in favor of the government were: Davis v.
State, 255 Ga. 588, 590-91, 340 S.E.2d 862, 865 (declining to review on appeal alleged deficiencies in
probable cause for defendant's arrest because defense counsel did not properly raise them at trial),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871 (1986); Blount v. State, 181 Ga. App. 330, 335-36, 352 S.E.2d 220, 225
(1986) (search of visitor's pocketbook and automobile, pursuant to search warrant for host's house,
held valid); State v. Rosof, 180 Ga. App. 637, 639-40, 350 S.E.2d 36, 39 (1986) (upholding airport
security officer's warrantless search of tobacco pouch that felt soft); Mosley v. State, 180 Ga. App.
30, 30, 348 S.E.2d 555, 556 (1986) (holding that tip from informant that defendant was growing
marijuana, and overflight by officer revealing greenhouse but no marijuana, provided sufficient
probable cause for search warrant); State v. Wilson, 179 Ga. App. 334, 337, 346 S.E.2d 111, 114
(1986) (holding that defendant's unkempt appearance, proximity to burglary site, and absence of
anyone else fitting description of burglar provided sufficient probable cause for warrantless arrest);
Luke v. State, 178 Ga. App. 614, 616, 344 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1986) (upholding warrantless search
conducted as part of bargain for defendant's wife's probation).
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cases involved consent searches, more than in any other state. Several of the
"consents" seemed suspicious,89 and I could not help wondering why people
being investigated by Georgia (and Louisiana) police were so much more
cooperative than people in other states.90 However, there is no way to evalu-
ate police credibility by reading an appellate opinion, so I rated these consent
cases as correctly decided, but added a separate column in the tables to keep
track of how often consents were occurring.
Evaluating South Carolina's track record was more difficult. With a popu-
lation of about 3.5 million and a crime rate of 5,137 per 100,000,91 South
Carolina decided only three fourth amendment cases by opinion in 1986.
Moreover, the one case decided for the defendant 92 was, according to South
Carolina sources, actually based on the trial court's refusal to appoint coun-
sel for an indigent capital defendant, rather than on the relatively minor
fourth amendment violation cited in the opinion.93 It seems unlikely that
South Carolina police officers are more competent at following the rather
complicated fourth amendment strictures than officers in other states or that
South Carolina trial courts are more sensitive to defendants' fourth amend-
89. For example, in Mitchell v. State, 178 Ga. App. 244, 342 S.E.2d 738 (1986), the defendant
was brought to the police station at the request of an officer investigating a robbery. The defendant
allegedly was told that he was not under arrest and "agreed to come with [the police]." Id. at 245,
342 S.E.2d at 740. At the station, the victim identified the defendant, and he was placed under
arrest. The defendant then executed a consent form for the search of his house and allegedly orally
consented to the search of his car. Id. at 245-46, 342 S.E.2d at 740-41. I was troubled by the
defendant's alleged "cooperation" at every stage of this case. However, if the facts are as stated in
the opinion, there appears to be no violation of either Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217
(1979) (information obtained from defendant after'illegal arrest excludable if obtained by exploita-
tion of illegality of arrest), or Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (voluntari-
ness of consent determined by totality of surrounding circumstances and not only by whether
subject of search knew of right to refuse consent). For other examples of suspicious consents, see
Jothier v. State, 177 Ga. App. 655, 655, 340 S.E.2d 624, 624-25 (1986) (defendent claimed that he
opened trunk of automobile at officer's command and not consensually); Wilson v. State, 179 Ga.
App. 780, 781, 347 S.E.2d 709, 710 (1986) (defendant denied at trial that he had consented to
search of automobile trunk and briefcase); and Conley v. State, 180 Ga. App. 662, 663, 350 S.E.2d
45, 46 (1986) (defendant denied at trial that he had consented to search of his boots after arriving at
airport).
90. A Georgia criminal defense attorney informed me that Georgia police receive training in
"euchring" or tricking consents out of suspects, particularly motorists stopped along Interstate 75
(the main route to and from Florida). Telephone interview with defense attorney (Aug. 1987). The
author conducted several interviews in August 1987 on the condition that identities be kept confi-
dential. Copies of these interview notes are on file at The Georgetown Law Journal.
Professor Yale Kamissar noted one reason for the abundance of consent searches: 'Consent' is
the 'trump card' in the law of search and seizure. For it is '[t]he easiest, most propitious way for the
police to avoid the myriad problems presented by the Fourth Amendment.'" Kamisar, supra note
35, at 41 (quoting Zion, A Decade of Constitutional Revision, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1979, § 6 (Mag-
azine), at 26, 106).
91. See Table I, supra (based on 1986 FBI Uniform Crime Statistics).
92. State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 347 S.E.2d 882 (1986).
93. Telephone interview with confidential source (Aug. 1987).
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ment rights. A much more likely explanation is that South Carolina is sim-
ply sweeping these violations under the rug, affirming convictions by
unpublished opinion (so that the issue raised on appeal cannot be
identified). 94
To better determine what was happening in South Carolina, I obtained the
briefs from some of the 1986 cases that were decided by unpublished opinion
and also read the reported cases from 1985 and 1987. The latter study pro-
duced six cases (three in each year): four were decided in favor of the gov-
ernment on the fourth amendment issue95 and two in favor of the
defendant.96 The four cases decided in favor of the government seemed cor-
rectly decided. One of the cases decided for the defendant, State v. Mc-
Knight,97 was based on, a South Carolina requirement that search warrant
affidavits must be in writing-a requirement that, as previously discussed, 98
has never been imposed by the United States Supreme Court. The other
case, State v. Cox,99 involved a search, with probable cause but no warrant,
of an automobile parked in the defendant's yard. °° In my view, the court
was correct to strike down this search on the ground that an automobile
parked in the curtilage of a house may be searched only with a warrant. 10 1
However, this issue is not entirely free from doubt in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in California v. Carney.10 2 Certainly, a court consistently
94. S.C. Sup. Cr. R. 23 (1986) provides for unreported opinions when, inter alia, "no error of
law appears."
95. State v. McSwain, 292 S.C. 206, 207, 355 S.E.2d 540, 541 (1987) (fourth amendment not
applicable to action of private party); State v. Adams, 291 S.C. 132, 134, 352 S.E.2d 483, 485 (1987)
(probable cause for search warrant existed when undercover operation revealed contemporaneous
drug deal at defendant's residence); Knight v. State, 284 S.C. 138, 141, 325 S.E.2d 535, 537 (1985)
(police officer authorized to stop vehicle when he had reasonable suspicion that occupants involved
in criminal activity); State v. Gaskins, 284 S.C. 105, 116, 326 S.E.2d 132, 139 (warrantless search of
prisoner's cell reasonable when inmate of adjoining cell killed in explosion), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1120 (1985).
96. State v. McKnight, 291 S.C. 110, 114, 352 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1987) (holding inadmissible items
seized pursuant to search warrant unsupported by written affidavit); State v. Cox, 287 S.C. 260, 264,
335 S.E.2d 809, 811 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that automobile parked in curtilage of house pro-
tected from warrantless search), aff'd, 290 S.C. 489, 351 S.E.2d 570 (1986).
97. 291 S.C. 110, 352 S.E.2d 471 (1987).
98. See supra text accompanying note 87 (although Supreme Court has never explicitly passed on
issue, prevailing view allows oral testimony to supplement written affidavit).
99. 287 S.C. 260, 335 S.E.2d 809 (Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 290 S.C. 489, 351 S.E.2d 570 (1986).
100. Id. at 262, 335 S.E.2d at 810.
101. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455-57 (1971) (plurality opinion) (automo-
bile parked in driveway cannot be searched incident to arrest because it is not in control of arrestee).
102. 471 U.S. 386 (1985). In Carney the Court held that the vehicle exception to the warrant
requirement applies if a vehicle is "found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential
purposes." Id. at 392. Thus, it upheld a search of a recreational vehicle parked in a downtown lot.
Id. at 395. It is not clear if the Court meant to include a driveway as a "place regularly used for
residential purposes" or if it meant to restrict this limitation to trailers or recreational vehicles
parked in trailer parks and hooked up to utilities.
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ill-disposed to fourth amendment claims might have decided Cox differently.
I also read four briefs filed in fourth amendment cases that had been affirmed
without opinion in 1986. In my view, all four cases were correctly
decided. 103
Thus, all available evidence suggests that the South Carolina courts are at
least somewhat responsive to fourth amendment claims. Of the thirteen total
cases considered, three were decided in favor of defendants, and none were
decided incorrectly in favor of the government. Still, the dearth of reported
cases suggests that further study of that state may be in order. In any event,
the failure of the South- Carolina courts to report these cases creates the im-
pression that fourth amendment issues are not taken seriously in that state.
In Arizona the statistics are striking. In 1975 Arizona decided forty-nine
fourth amendment cases by opinion and, in the cases studied, decided 22.2%
for the defendant.10 4 In 1986, Arizona's population having increased by over
one million people since 1975, the state appellate courts decided only four
cases by opinion. 05 By contrast, Idaho, with one-third the population of
Arizona, decided thirteen fourth amendment cases by opinion in 1986.106
Of course, the fact that opinions are unpublished does not necessarily
mean that they have been decided against the defendant. It seems likely,
however, that most unpublished opinions would be progovernment because a
prodefendant decision is likely to result in reversal of a conviction and is
therefore a more significant event than a routine affirmance. Moreover, the
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is largely lost if an opinion in favor
of the defendant is not published.
It also is possible that the lack of prodefendant appellate decisions simply
reflects good police work. This possibility was suggested to me by both an
103. The cases were State v. Smith; State v. Gridine; State v. Johnson; and State v. Gave (briefs
did not bear case numbers). Two of these cases, Gridine and Smith, presented the issue of whether
an affidavit could be supplemented by the testimony of the officers.
104. See Table II, supra (of 18 cases studied, 4 decided for defendant).
105. Arizona Supreme Court Rule 11 l(b) provides that disposition is to be by published opinion
when it:
1. Establishes, alters, modifies or clarifies a rule of law, or
2. Calls attention to a rule of law that has been generally overlooked, or
3. Criticizes existing law, or
4. Involves a legal or factual issue of unique interest or substantial public importance
ARIZ. S. Cr. R. 11l(b). An Arizona appellate judge estimated that "80-90%" of appellate court
opinions are unpublished but that most Arizona Supreme Court opinions are published because
they grant certiorari for the purpose of issuing opinions in important cases. Telephone interview
with Arizona judge (Aug. 1987).
106. Table I, supra.
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Arizona judge and a defense attorney.10 7 While I was dubious about this
proposition, it is not inconceivable that Arizona, a state in which most of the
law enforcement occurs in two counties (Pima and Maricopa), could possess
police officers who are actually trained to follow the fourth amendment rules.
This seems especially likely if the police obtain warrants frequently, taking
advantage of the recently established "good faith exception" to the exclusion-
ary rule in warrant cases. 08
To test this hypothesis I analyzed the briefs in five unpublished 1986 Ari-
zona cases that raised fourth amendment issues and that had been affirmed
without opinion. 0 9 In my view, four of these cases clearly were correctly
decided. 110 The fifth, Arizona v. Barfield,"' is close. In Barfield the police
saw the defendant, "who looked as dirty and unkempt as the other transients
... in that area," carrying a duffel bag through a public park in Tucson one
morning. 112 Outlined in the bag was a square object that the police officers
thought resembled a video cassette recorder. They stopped Barfield, asked
for identification, and asked to look in the bag. He identified himself but
refused to consent to the search." 3 When they asked "if he was afraid that
there was anything in the bag that may be stolen," he said no. 114 The police
officers asked again for permission to look in the bag, and Barfield again
refused. They continued to talk to him, and "eventually he agreed to let [the
police officers] look in the bag."''115 The officers found a cassette tape player
and other property that later proved to be stolen.116
The defendant's attorney argued that there was no reasonable suspicion
for the stop under Terry v. Ohio 117 and that the consent to search was invalid
107. By "good" the attorney meant in conformity with recent Supreme Court decisions. Tele-
phone interview with defense attorney (Aug. 1987).
108. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (establishing good faith exception); see
also Bradley, The "Good Faith Exception" Cases: Reasonable Exercises in Futility, 60 IND. L.J. 287,
292 (1985) (predicting that good faith exception is likely to increase warrant use); Note, supra note
31, at 1050-51 (finding that in Chicago, "the vast majority of searches occurs pursuant to
warrants").
109. The briefs were chosen at random by a University of Arizona law student (i.e., they were
the first five search and seizure cases he found in the library files).
110. Arizona v. Earles, No. 2CA-CR4292 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 1987); Arizona v. McGuire,
No. 2CA-CR4493 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 1987); Arizona v. Sandon, No. 2CA-CR3076 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Jan. 15, 1986); Arizona v. Wickman, No. 1CA-CR8495 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 1986). Cop-
ies of the briefs in Earles and McGuire are on file at The Georgetown Law Journal
111. No. 2CA-CR4387 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 23, 1986) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal).
112. Appellee's Answering Brief at 1, Arizona v. Barfield, No. 2CA-CR4387 (Ariz. Ct. App.
July 23, 1986).
113. Id. at 1-2.
114. Id. at 2.
115. Id.
116. Id. at4.
117. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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because of the defendant's two prior refusals to consent.1 18 Even conceding
the validity of the stop, a consent obtained only after two prior refusals by
the defendant does not seem to be one as to which the state has satisfied its
burden of proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given. 119
Notwithstanding Barfield, this preliminary survey suggests that Arizona
police may well be following fourth amendment strictures in most cases, de-
spite the lack of appellate decisions. 120 In fact, the police obtained search
warrants in six of the twelve Arizona cases studied (including the four re-
ported cases), including two cases (an auto search and a search incident to
arrest) in which a warrant was not even required by United States Supreme
Court cases. Still, a more complete survey of the Arizona cases is in order.
Utah, with half the population and twice the reported opinions of Ari-
zona, 121 appears to be doing a good job. However, the relative paucity of
reported opinions still raises questions about what is going on behind the
scenes.
As for the other states, Idaho stands out both in its enthusiastic regard for
defendants' fourth amendment rights and in the overall quality of the opin-
ions. The Idaho opinions reflect thoughtfulness and a command of Supreme
Court precedent. The following passage is indicative of the Idaho Supreme
Court's attitude: "We must never forget that a violation of one person's
Fourth Amendment... rights is a violation of every person's rights. Only by
suppressing the illegally obtained evidence, and deterring future illegal con-
118. Appellant's Reply Brief at 6, Barfield (No. 2CA-CR4387).
119. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (state has burden of proving that
"consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or im-
plied"). Professor LaFave points out that, unlike a request for counsel during custodial interroga-
tion, a refusal of consent to search is not final and absolute. 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 8.2(f),
at 200-01. However, the cases that have approved a second request by the police have done so
because the request was not overly coercive. See United States v. Morrow, 731 F.2d 233, 235 (4th
Cir.) (approved girlfriend's consent to search jointly occupied apartment when withdrawal of first
consent resulted from "menacing" presence of defendant), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1230 (1984);
United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1974) (approved consent given to
search personal belongings in airplane after consent refused to search whole airplane), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 924 (1975).
120. On the surface, Arizona's record appears equivocal. Two justices of the Arizona Supreme
Court have advocated abolishing the exclusionary rule in serious felony cases. State v. Bolt, 142
Ariz. 260, 270, 689 P.2d 519, 529 (1984) (en banc) (Cameron, J., with Hayes, J., concurring) (advo-
cating adoption of balancing test in which exclusionary rule would not be applied "whenever the
societal costs of applying the rule exceed societal benefits"). On the other hand, two notable recent
Arizona criminal procedure cases have decided close issues in favor of the defendants. Arizona v.
Mauro, 149 Ariz. 24, 29-32, 716 P.2d 393, 399-400 (1986) (en banc) (taping conversation between
defendant and wife after defendant refused to talk to police violated Miranda), rev'd, 107 S. Ct.
1931 (1987); Arizona v. Hicks, 146 Ariz. 533, 534, 707 P.2d 331, 332 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that
police exceeded scope of warrantless search allowed by exigent circumstances and plain view doc-
trine), aff'd, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
121. Table I, supra.
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duct, can a court effectively protect innocent people from impermissible inva-
sions of their constitutional rights."' 122
Illinois has a decidedly mixed record: on the one hand, it is relatively
likely to decide a fourth amendment issue in favor of the defendant (23.5%
of the time); on the other hand, it is second only to Georgia in deciding cases
wrongly in favor of the government (15.7% of the time). 123
Illinois is a good example of a second problem that my data disclosed: in
many cases, neither the police nor the courts could follow the rules. Nearly
40% of the Illinois cases either were, or should have been, reversed accord-
ing to the United States Supreme Court's rules, 124 yet no case involved clear-
cut police misconduct. In 19.6% of the cases considered (ten of fifty-one),
the trial court had granted the defendant's motion to suppress. In 80.0% of
those cases (eight of ten), the appellate courts reversed the trial court but, in
my view, 37.5% (three of eight) of those reversals were incorrect. 125 In an-
other 19.6% of the cases studied (ten of fifty-one), the appellate court re-
versed the trial court for not granting the motion to suppress. If the courts,
after briefing, argument, and calm reflection, cannot agree on the law, how
are the police expected to do so?
For example, in People v. Ocasio, 126 the police arrested the defendant at his
home for murder. They had probable cause but no warrant.1 27 The defend-
ant made incriminating statements after receipt of Miranda warnings. 128
The court concluded that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless
122. State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 529, 716 P.2d 1288, 1301 (1986). On the other hand,
Idaho is not "soft." I noted no Idaho cases incorrectly decided for the defendant.
123. Table I, supra.
124. Id. (51 cases studied: 12 decided for defendant and 8 wrongly decided for government).
125. The three incorrect reversals are: People v. Parent, 148 Ill. App. 3d 957, 958-59, 500
N.E.2d 80, 81 (1986) (holding valid a warrantless "walk through" search of defendant's house after
defendant had been removed and taken to police station); People v. Kessler, 147 Ill. App. 3d 237,
240-42, 497 N.E.2d 1323, 1325-26 (1986) (holding that defendant consented to search through
"nonverbal conduct" of backing away from door); People v. Wilson, 141 Ill. App. 3d 156, 159-60,
490 N.E.2d 701, 703-04 (1986) (holding that search of duffle bag justified as search incident to
arrest or as limited Terry search). The other five Illinois cases I counted as "wrongly decided for
the government" are: People v. Martin, 148 Il1. App. 3d 1061, 1067-68, 500 N.E.2d 528, 533 (1986)
(upholding trial court's refusal to hear defendant's offer of proof that warrants had been issued for
two separate premises and both warrants contained similar information); People v. Ocasio, 148 Ill.
App. 3d 418, 423-26, 499 N.E.2d 528, 531-32 (1986) (upholding warrantless arrest at home despite
questionable exigent circumstances); People v. Stachelek, 145 I1. App, 3d 391, 398-400, 495 N.E.2d
984, 989-90 (1986) (holding that probable cause for arrest existed when defendant found in apart-
ment with individual identified as participint in crime and police spotted blood on defendant's
clothing); People v. Turner, 143 Ill. App. 3d 417, 423-24, 493 N.E.2d 38, 42 (1986) (holding that
consent was given for police to enter home despite testimony by defendant and his mother that they
did not consent); People v. Dyer, 141 Ill. App. 3d 326, 330-32, 490 N.E.2d 237, 240-41 (1986)
(upholding stop of automobile despite no evidence that automobile used in crime).
126. 148 Ill. App. 3d 418, 499 N.E.2d 528 (1986).
127. Id. at 422-23, 499 N.E.2d at 530-31.
128. Id. at 420, 499 N.E.2d at 529.
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arrest, in part because of the seriousness of the crime and the fact that the
perpetrator of a stabbing murder was obviously armed.12 9 However, the
arrest occurred twelve hours after the crime and nearly two hours after the
police had probable cause. The court averred that "it was not unreasonable
for the officers to believe that the defendant might have escaped if not swiftly
apprehended."1 30 No basis for this belief is stated beyond the defendant's
involvement in this crime. This decision is clearly wrong under current
law. 131
Still, given that it would have been proper to arrest the defendant without
a warrant had the police officers found him on the street, 132 it was not obvi-
ously unreasonable for them to look for him both on and off the street and to
arrest him where they found him, at least when the arrest in the home was
solely for the purpose of obtaining custody rather than as an excuse to search
the home incident to the arrest. The pressures on the defendant to confess
are not significantly different than they would have been had he been sub-
jected to a warrantless arrest on the street, yet, in that case, the confession
clearly would have been admissible.
Another example of understandable police confusion about fourth amend-
ment rules is People v. Parent. 133 In that case the defendant was charged
with possession of an explosive device. Neighbors had called police to report
gunshots from the defendant's yard. When the police arrived, the defendant
ran into his home. The police were informed that he had automatic weap-
ons. They entered the house to arrest him (apparently for shooting at his
neighbors) and saw a gun which they (properly) seized. When his girlfriend
went into the kitchen a policeman followed her and saw another gun which
was (properly) seized. After the defendant was arrested and transported to
the police station, remaining officers conducted a "walk through" of the
apartment and found additional weapons and an explosive device.1 34 The
appellate court approved this as a "protective sweep" incident to arrest. 135
While such a protective sweep may have been justified during the arrest, it
hardly is justified after the defendant has been taken away. However, the
police cannot be faulted too severely, as they might have found this case
similar to others in which the Supreme Court has used a "vested rights"
129. Id. at 424, 427, 499 N.E.2d at 532, 533.
130. Id. at 424, 499 N.E.2d at 532.
131. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (holding that warrant required to arrest
individual in home, unless exigent circumstances present); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602-03
(1975) (Miranda warning does not remove taint of fourth amendment violation unless intervening
events sufficiently attenuate violation).
132. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976) (upholding warrantless public
arrests).
133. 148 Ill. App. 3d 957, 500 N.E.2d 80 (1986).
134. Id. at 958, 500 N.E.2d at 80-81.
135. Id. at 959, 500 N.E.2d at 81.
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approach to justify, as incident to arrest, the search of an automobile after
the defendant has been removed. 136
"Consents" occurred almost as often in Illinois (15.7% of the time) as in
Georgia (19.3% of the time).137 However, it did not appear that Illinois reg-
ularly employed consent as a device to avoid grappling with fourth amend-
ment issues. The facts in two of the consent cases were presented in sufficient
detail for me to conclude that the appellate court findings of valid consent
were wrong. 138 In a third case, the defendant agreed that he had con-
sented.1 39 Still, it is disturbing that the United States Supreme Court, with
one hand, creates an overly elaborate scheme of fourth amendment protec-
tions and, with the other, provides the police with an easy means of circum-
venting it, which the police used 16.6% of the time (37 of 223 cases) in the
states studied in 1986.140
Oklahoma seemed to be doing a good job, deciding three cases for the
defendant and none wrongly for the government.1'1 However, the relative
scarcity of reported opinions again makes it difficult to be completely confi-
dent that the fourth amendment is being strictly enforced.142
Louisiana, while not generally ill-disposed to fourth amendment claims
(9.5% of the cases decided in favor of defendants), 143 nevertheless approved
the most flagrant example of police misconduct that I discovered. In State v.
Williams, 144 a stabbing murder by a burglar had occurred at a house two-
fifths of a mile from where the defendant was staying. The victim was heard
136. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981) (allowing warrantless search of auto-
mobile passenger compartment incident to lawful arrest after defendants had been removed);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (allowing warrantless automobile search after police
had driven vehicle to police station).
137. Table I, supra (consents occurred in 8 of 51 cases studied in Illinois and in 11 of 57 cases
studied in Georgia).
138. See supra note 125 (discussing People v. Kessler, 147 II. App. 3d 237, 497 N.E.2d 1323
(1986), and People v. Turner 143 Ill. App. 3d 417, 493 N.E.2d 38 (1986)).
139. People v. Whitfield, 140 11. App. 3d 433, 439, 488 N.E.2d 1087, 1091 (1986) (defendant
signed consent to search form as part of his employment).
140. Table I, supra.
141. Id.
142. Only 19 fourth amendment cases were decided by opinion in Oklahoma in 1986. Id.
143. Id.
144. 490 So. 2d 255 (La. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3277 (1987). The other four Louisiana
cases that I counted as "wrong" were: State v. Payne, 489 So. 2d 1289, 1292-93 (La. Ct. App.)
(holding that search of bag attached to defendant's bicycle was proper during Terry stop), writ
denied, 493 So. 2d 1217 (La. 1986); State v. Jones, 483 So. 2d 1207, 1208-09 (La. Ct. App.) (holding
that police had reasonable suspicion to make Terry stop and to remove "pill formation" from de-
fendant's pocket), writ denied, 488 So. 2d 197 (La. 1986); State v. Washington, 482 So. 2d 171, 173-
74 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding search warrant valid based on hearsay of informant and two-hour
surveillance of apartment during which time two suspicious visits took place); State v. Brown, 482
So. 2d 115, 116-17 (La. Ct. App.) (upholding police pat-down of individual who, with "suspicious
bulge" in jacket, walked through area linked to narcotics traffic), writ denied, 487 So. 2d 436 (La.
1986).
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to shout, "This black man is killing me," and "darkly pigmented skin" was
discovered on the window ledge through which the murderer had escaped.
The police had no other evidence but knew that the defendant, who earlier
had been convicted for burglary, was in the area on furlough from a prison
camp. Police officers went to his grandfather's house "to pick [him] up for
questioning."'' 45 According to the court, he "voluntarily accompanied the
detectives to the sheriff's office." 146
At the office the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and signed a
waiver form. Police officers then ordered him to strip so that they could look
for scratches and told him he would not be released unless he complied.
Scratches were noted, and "[a]fter further interrogation the defendant finally
admitted that he had murdered [the victim]. ' 14 7
The court made no effort to argue that the defendant was not under arrest,
which he plainly was at least by the time he was ordered to strip, 148 or that
this arrest was based on probable cause. Rather, it denied defendant's mo-
tion to suppress the confession on the grounds that his status as a furloughed
prisoner meant that he had no expectation of privacy. 149
The court thus relied upon the patently unsound "constructive custody"
theory,150 which has been advanced, and rejected, in other cases to justify
warrantless searches of parolees.15' As the Supreme Court pointed out in a
related context in Morrissey v. Brewer:152 "Although the parolee is often
formally described as being 'in custody,' the argument cannot.., be made
here that summary treatment is necessary as it may be with respect to con-
trolling a large group of potentially disruptive prisoners in actual
custody." 5 3
145. Williams, 490 So. 2d at 257.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 258.
148. The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that this scenario constitutes an arrest. See Duna-
way v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979) (picking someone up for questioning and transporting
him to police station for interrogation constitutes "arrest"). In Dunaway the defendant also had
"voluntarily" accompanied the police in the sense that he had acceded to a police request to come
down to the station. Id. at 222-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
149. Williams, 490 So. 2d at 260.
150. Id.
151. For a general discussion of the "constructive custody" theory, see 4 W. LAFAVE, supra note
21, § 10.10(a).
152. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
153. Id. at 483; cf Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-28 (1984) (citing "institutional security"
as basis for holding that no expectation of privacy exists in prison cell).
The recent case of Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S. Ct. 3164 (1987), in which the Court upheld a
warrantless search of a probationer's home by probation officers on "reasonable grounds" as au-
thorized by the state probation statute, is distinguishable. The Louisiana court in Williams gave no
indication that furloughed inmates were subject to the kind of statutory regulation that was present
in Griffin. Moreover, the Louisiana search was not part of a "special" regulatory scheme "beyond
normal law enforcement," as was the Wisconsin search. Griffin, 107 S. Ct. at 3168. Rather, this
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Professor LaFave indicates that recent opinions also have rejected this
"constructive custody" argument as a "mere fiction." 154 If the arrest of the
defendant in Williams was unconstitutional, so too were the strip search and
subsequent confession.15 5
IV. WHAT Is To BE DONE?
Assuming that the existence of "wrongly" decided opinions in the state
courts poses a problem one wants to correct, what should be done? One
solution would be to restore federal habeas jurisdiction, as Stone's critics
have urged. I do not urge this, for two reasons. First, such a wholesale
restoration of habeas jurisdiction would create a substantial burden on the
federal courts since they would no longer be able to summarily dismiss
fourth amendment issues. This burden should be placed on the federal
courts only if there is reason to believe it is necessary to do so. Second, and
more importantly, it is highly unlikely that such a solution would work since,
as discussed, Stone's elimination of federal habeas jurisdiction does not seem
to have made much difference in fourth amendment enforcement by the
states surveyed. In any event, a solution is available that is compatible with
Stone.
A. THE "OPPORTUNITY FOR FULL AND FAIR LITIGATION" EXCEPTION
The Supreme Court's ban on federal habeas jurisdiction over fourth
amendment claims was not absolute. The Stone Court recognized that fed-
eral habeas corpus jurisdiction would still lie if a state had not "provided an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of [the] Fourth Amendment claim."' 156
The Court provided scant elaboration of this exception. 157 Just what this
language means has been the subject of considerable debate in the lower fed-
was simply an ordinary criminal investigation by ordinary police. They were not in any sense
engaged in the sort of "supervisory" function that the Court approved in Griffin. Id.
154. 4 W. LAFAVE, supra note 21, at 131.
155. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) (confession obtained after unlawful arrest
is inadmissible despite Miranda warning, unless an intervening event breaks causal connection be-
tween illegal arrest and incriminating statement).
156. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494. This exception, and the majority opinion in Stone as a whole, was
obviously influenced by Professor Bator's article, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963), which is cited several times in Stone, 428
U.S. at 475 n.7, 494 n.35, as well as in Justice Powell's concurrence in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 253 nn. 3 & 5, 255 n.7 & 259 n.13 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). However, as
Professor Halpern has demonstrated, Bator's views do not aid in interpreting the exception in Stone.
Halpern, supra note 10, at 16-17 (while Bator's views are based on interpretation of federal habeas
corpus statute, Stone and its exception are based "on a constitutional judgment about the source of
the exclusionary rule").
157. Only a cryptic reference to Townsend v. Said is provided. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 n.36 (citing
Townsend, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)). Professor Halpern has demonstrated that Townsend provides little
help in interpreting this exception. Halpern, supra note 10, at 14-16 & n.94 (Townsend assumes that
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eral courts.158 As Professor Halpern has concluded, however, "[m]ost lower
federal courts interpret Stone's use of the term 'opportunity' to mean that
habeas corpus review of a fourth amendment claim may be available only
where state process was defective" and not when the state courts have simply
decided the fourth amendment issue wrongly. 159 Since the states generally
provide forums in which to litigate these claims, the practical effect of this
view is that "wherever state courts reject fourth amendment claims on their
merits [however erroneously], habeas applicants are generally unsuccessful in
obtaining federal review on the basis of alleged procedural defects at trial or
on appeal." 160
Given the rationale for Stone in the first place-that fourth amendment
violations have nothing to do with guilt or innocence and that the cost of
enforcing the exclusionary rule at the federal habeas level is not worth the
limited benefit of additional deterrence, if any, of police misconduct-the
process-based view seems correct. However, one wonders why the Court de-
clared the exception. In advancing the deterrent interest served by the exclu-
sionary rule, what is the difference between allowing federal habeas relief for
the limited class of defendants unable to raise fourth amendment issues at
trial but denying it to the larger class of defendants whose claims were
wrongly decided? As Justice Brennan pointed out, dissenting in Stone, if a
general grant of federal habeas review would not increase deterrence of po-
lice misbehavior significantly, as the majority assumed, then surely granting
such review in those cases in which the defendant was not accorded an "op-
portunity for full and fair litigation of his claim" will not do so either.1 6
Therefore this exception is totally inconsistent with Stone's main policy
choice, that resort to habeas corpus "other than to assure that no innocent
person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in serious intrusions
on values important to our system of government."1 62 Since the prisoner
who claims solely that he was convicted on the basis of illegally seized evi-
defendant has received evidentiary hearing and is thus irrelevant to deciding whether defendant had
sufficient opportunity to obtain such hearing).
158. Compare Gamble v. Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1978) ("Opportunity for full
and fair consideration' includes, but is not limited to, the procedural opportunity to raise or other-
wise present a Fourth Amendment claim. It also includes [a] full and fair evidentiary hearing...
[and] recognition and at least colorable application of the correct Fourth Amendment constitu-
tional standards." (footnote omitted)) with Swicegood v. Alabama, 577 F.2d 1322, 1324 (5th Cir.
1978) (using Stone to reject defendant's claims that he did not receivefull consideration because
state courts dealt with illegal arrest only "in passing" and that he did not receive fair hearing
because state courts misapplied federal constitutional law).
159. Halpern, supra note 10, at 18.
160. Id. at 20. Moreover, "actual litigation on the merits in the state courts is not necessary" as
long as "the defendant had the opportunity to litigate." Id. at 21.
161. Stone, 428 U.S. at 514 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 491 n.31 (majority opinion).
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dence is making no claim that he is "innocent," he seemingly is not entitled
to relief under this strict policy reading of Stone.
By creating this exception, the Stone Court must have been endeavoring to
advance some goal of habeas corpus other than protection of the innocent.
What is that goal?
Stone represents the victory of the "narrow" over the "broad" view of
federal habeas corpus. The broad view adopted by the Court in 1963 in Fay
v. Noia 163 noted that the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,164 which first extended
federal habeas corpus to state prisoners, was "designed to furnish a method
additional to and independent of direct Supreme Court review of state court
decisions for the vindication of the new constitutional guarantees." 165
The Act was adopted because Congress "distrusted the courts of the
southern states and expected that they would be totally unreceptive to the
Reconstruction legislation." 166 Interpreting the same 1867 Act, a majority of
the Stone Court was influenced by Justice Powell's concurrence in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 16 7 which rejected the broad view as a "revisionist
view" of history.' 68 Stone held that habeas corpus should be limited to the
narrow concern of assuring that no innocent person suffers an unconstitu-
tional loss of liberty.
Thus, while the narrow view won out in Stone, the full and fair litigation
exception represents the lingering inclination to distrust the states, which
animated the 1867 Act and, more importantly, the Supreme Court's 1961
decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 169 which applied the exclusionary rule to the states.
Justice Powell, speaking for the Stone majority, simply was not willing to
assume that the states.always would provide a fair opportunity to litigate
fourth amendment claims. If the states did not do so, the exclusionary rule's
deterrent effect would be lost, and state and local police could feel free to
ignore the fourth amendment's strictures. This result would be unacceptable
to a Court that continues to insist that Mapp is the law of the land, as it
163. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
164. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (1982)). The act provided that: "the several courts of the United States... shall have power
to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty
in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States." Id.
165. Fay, 372 U.S. at 416; see also 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 27.2, at
294 (1984) (purpose of 1867 Act was to give "federal courts superintending control so as to ensure
that there would be full recognition of the federal rights already established in the 1866 Civil Rights
Act and about to be established in the Fourteenth Amendment" (footnote omitted)).
166. 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 165, at 294.
167. 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 252. But see Tushnet, Judicial Revision of the Habeas Corpus Statutes: A Note on
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 484, 487-92 (arguing that legislative history of 1867
Act supports broad view).
169. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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reiterated in Stone.170
However, there is another way to deny defendants a full and fair opportu-
nity to litigate fourth amendment claims beyond refusing to hear them-that
is to hear such claims and then consistently decide them against defendants,
regardless of the merits. This is precisely what is occurring on the record in
Georgia and, possibly, off the record in South Carolina and Arizona. Just as
if a state were not allowing defendants to litigate fourth amendment claims,
the consistent refusal to grant relief on those claims will cause a state's police
officers, prosecutors, and even defense attorneys to stop taking the fourth
amendment seriously-the very result that the Stone exception appears to
have been designed to avoid.
B. USING THE EXCEPTION TO PREVENT NONENFORCEMENT
If a defense attorney can demonstrate such a pattern in the courts of a
particular state, it is reasonable for the federal courts sitting in that state to
resume federal habeas jurisdiction on the basis of the Stone exception. That
is, federal courts can reasonably conclude at some point that defendants are
not provided a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate fourth amendment
claims because of a consistent nonenforcement bias in the state courts. Such
jurisdiction, which could be temporary, is entirely consistent with the Stone
Court's unwillingness "to assume that there now exists a general lack of ap-
propriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the [state courts]."'1 71 It is
reasonable to believe that, faced with direct evidence of such "insensitivity,"
as is provided by the cases collected in this article, the Stone majority's atti-
tude toward habeas corpus review in those states might well have been
different.
Such a solution does not open the floodgates of litigation, for as my study
indicates, attorneys in most states will be unable to demonstrate the pattern
of noncompliance necessary to convince the federal court even to consider
the merits of their claim. Moreover, I do not claim that this study, by itself,
provides the basis for such a federal court's decision to intervene. Rather, I
would urge federal judges in Georgia to read the ten cases I characterized as
"wrongly decided in favor of the government." If the judges agree that
Georgia has decided these, or most of these, cases wrongly, then that, com-
bined with the unarguable fact that Georgia decided only two of fifty-seven
170. Stone, 428 U.S. at 484-86. Only Chief Justice Burger, concurring in Stone, urged that Mapp
be overruled. Id. at 496 (Burger, C.J., concurring). While Justice Rehnquist did not join this con-
currence, he has on other occasions expressed a similar view. See California v. Minjares, 443 U.S.
916, 927-28 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., with Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of stay) (arguing that
parties and Solicitor General should have opportunity to brief question of whether exclusionary rule
should be retained).
171. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 n.35.
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reported cases for defendants in 1986, should lead to the reestablishment of
federal habeas jurisdiction in Georgia for some reasonable period of time.
Similarly, attorneys in South Carolina, Arizona, and perhaps some of the
other states in which opinions are rarely reported should study the briefs of
unreported cases. Such analysis will enable them to convince federal judges
that there exists, in states not enforcing the fourth amendment, such a persis-
tent pattern of defendants not winning and of cases being wrongly decided in
favor of the government that defendants are not in fact being granted a full
and fair opportunity to litigate fourth amendment claims.
It must be emphasized that this solution does not permit a federal court to
assume habeas jurisdiction to correct a single ruling by the state courts, no
matter how egregiously wrong. Thus, in Louisiana, just because the Williams
case was a bad decision,17 2 it is probably not fair to conclude on the basis of
the data collected in this study that defendants do not receive a full and fair
opportunity to raise these claims. After all, defendants in Louisiana won
9.5% of the time while 11.9% of the cases were wrongly decided for the
government. 173 Similarly, in Illinois, even though a substantial percentage of
cases (15.7%) were wrongly decided in favor of the government, an even
more substantial percentage of cases (23.5%) were decided in favor of de-
fendants.174 While Illinois police (and courts) apparently could benefit from
better training and from more comprehensible fourth amendment law, there
is no reason to conclude that they have received a tacit message from the
appellate courts to ignore the fourth amendment. The evidence in this sur-
vey indicates that Illinois defendants receive a full and fair opportunity to
litigate these issues, even if the overall quality of the decisions is not high. 175
In not approving federal habeas jurisdiction on the basis of a showing of
serious error in a single case, I differ from Professor Halpern, who urges that
"habeas corpus relief should be available under Stone's exception to correct
judicial errors which, if otherwise uncorrected, could lead to diminished po-
lice adherence to fourth amendment values" such as "where a state's highest
172. See supra notes 144-55 and accompanying text (discussing State v. Williams, 490 So. 2d 255
(La. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3277 (1987)).
173. Table I, supra. However, a court conceivably could conclude that this rate of bad decisions
for the government (11.9%) combined with the high rate of consent searches (nearly a quarter of
the cases studied) demonstrates a denial of a full and fair opportunity for Louisiana defendants to be
heard. Certainly Louisiana bears further study.
174. Id.
175. The idea that Illinois courts are by no means hostile to fourth amendment claims is partially
supported by a recent study showing that Chicago courts granted motions to suppress in 63.8% of
all cases in which motions to suppress physical evidence were filed. Nardulli, The Societal Costs of
the Exclusionary Rule Revisited, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 223, 231 [hereinafter Costs Revisited]. This
compares to an earlier study by the same author that found a success rate of about 17.2% (27 of
157) on the same type of motions in three mid-sized Illinois counties. Nardulli, The Societal Costs
of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 585, 598.
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court has announced an erroneous and fertile fourth amendment rule of
decision."x 76
Professor Halpern elaborates with this example:
[S]uppose a state supreme court interprets a state statute as authorizing
random stops of motorists to check drivers' licenses and vehicle registra-
tion. The court further holds that the statute is consistent with the fourth
amendment, and affirms a conviction for possession of illegal drugs discov-
ered incident to a random stop under the statute. If the fourth amendment
decision is erroneous, every motorist and passenger in the state is
threatened with an "unreasonable seizure." Consequently, habeas review
is appropriate given the significant impact of the decision on the privacy
interest of so many persons. 177
While Professor Halpern's interpretation of the Stone exception is consis-
tent with advancing the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule, it is in-
consistent with the Stone Court's express language and with the lower federal
courts' nearly universal interpretation of that language. The defendant in the
auto search hypothetical patently has had an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of his fourth amendment claim. His only complaint is that the
claim was wrongly decided and that the decision will have broad conse-
quences. But as Professor Halpern observes, the lower federal courts do not
recognize a wrong decision on the merits as providing grounds for federal
habeas relief, for to do so would vitiate Stone.178 That the decision may have
broad consequences is a matter to be raised in the petition for certiorari on
direct appeal, not on collateral attack in federal court. 179 Moreover, as soon
as "wrong and consequential" is recognized as a ground for federal habeas
jurisdiction, the federal courts once again will be forced to deal with large
numbers of habeas corpus petitions because many fourth amendment claims,
if wrong, could be deemed consequential.18 0 The Court's goal in Stone of
"effective utilization of limited judicial resources" thus would be lost.' 8
The above analysis assumes that the Court essentially is satisfied with the
current state of fourth amendment law and simply would like to ensure its
176. Halpern, supra note 10, at 31.
177. Id. at 32 (footnotes omitted).
178. Id. at 17-18.
179. The purpose of certiorari jurisdiction is to "pass upon questions of wide import under the
Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States." R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 190 (6th ed. 1986) (quoting address of Chief Justice Vinson before
American Bar Association, Sept. 7, 1949).
180. See United States ex rel. Carbone v. Manson, 447 F. Supp. 611, 616 (D. Conn. 1978) ("If
this Court were to rule that Stone does not preclude habeas corpus review because the Connecticut
Supreme Court did not apply an appropriate standard of review ... it would be the rare state
prisoner indeed who would not allege this.").
181. Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 n.31 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
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more consistent enforcement. As previously suggested, however, there is
much reason to be dissatisfied with that law and to desire to change it
substantially.
C. THE NEED FOR SIMPLICITY IN FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW
The totals in Table I tell much about the costs of enforcing the current
body of search and seizure law. Of 223 cases studied in 1986, over a quarter
either were or should have been decided for the defendant1 82 according to the
various "rules" announced by the Supreme Court. Most of these cases did
result, or could have resulted, in the reversal of a conviction 183 and the re-
lease of a (convicted) criminal. Many other cases either were dismissed
before trial or were plea bargained because of police search and seizure mis-
takes, not to mention fifth and sixth amendment errors. 184
Yet, in only a very few of these 223 cases did I consider the police behavior
clearly "wrong" in any obvious way. In all of the others, at least as the facts
were disclosed in the opinions,' 85 the police seem to have acted in a way most
people would have considered reasonable had they not known of the excruci-
atingly complex rules the police are expected to follow.' 86 Indeed, readers
inclined to be critical of this study may well note that in the cases discussed
the police behavior seemed reasonable. My response is: "I didn't write the
rules."
I have suggested in a previous article that, as a matter of theoretical consis-
tency, there are two and only two ways, of structuring fourth amendment
law. 187 The first is that the police must be instructed to obtain a warrant
whenever possible (by telephone if necessary), subject to a single, narrowly
182. See Table I, supra (35 cases decided for defendant (15.7%) and 23 wrongly decided for
government (10.3%), or a total of 26.0%).
183. Such is my impression. I did not collect data on the criticality of the evidence that was or
should have been suppressed. Professor Nardulli found that only 2.1% of cases in Chicago in
which a motion to suppress physical evidence was granted resulted in a conviction. Nardulli, Costs
Revisited, supra note 175, at 233. This suggests that a failure to suppress illegally seized evidence is
not often likely to be deemed "harmless" in the sense that the improperly admitted evidence did not
add much to the prosecution's case.
184. Professor Nardulli found that, in Chicago, motions to suppress an identification were suc-
cessful 47.9% of the time, and motions to suppress a confession were successful 6.1% of the time.
Id. at 231.
185. I am not oblivious to the possibility that the appellate court might slant the facts in order to
make the opinion come out "right." There is no way to control for this factor other than to note
that, because more than a quarter of the cases studied either were or should have been decided for
the defendant on the reported facts, the courts are not consistently slanting the facts to favor the
police.
186. For a discussion of this complexity, see Bradley, supra note 15, at 1501 (current fourth
amendment law "is so full of ficticious rules and multifaceted exceptions (and exceptions to these
exceptions) that the most that could be said of anyone's grasp of the doctrine is that 'he sees where
most of the problems are' ").
187. See id. (providing a complete description of the two models that I propose).
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drawn, exigent circumstance exception.188 The second is that the police sim-
ply be instructed to act "reasonably"-the only general limitation on
searches and seizures imposed by the langauge of the fourth amendment.18 9
This study, combined with Professor Nardulli's startling finding of a
63.8% success rate for motions to suppress physical evidence in Chicago, 190
provides the factual underpinning for the conclusion that something must be
done about fourth amendment rules. It is just plain wrong to claim that the
exclusionary rule comes at too high a cost. My experience as a prosecutor
convinced me that Mapp v. Ohio was right: without the exclusionary rule,
the police will not enforce the fourth amendment. 191 Therefore, the cost of
the exclusionary rule is the cost of having a meaningful fourth amendment.
The problem is not the exclusionary rule, but that the underlying fourth
amendment law is too complex. Things have gone too far when in twenty-six
percent of the cases at the appellate level alone the police and trial courts
have "erred" while apparently trying their best to follow the fourth amend-
ment rules.19 2 The police must be given a very few simple rules that they can
follow, search after search, year after year, if the ideal of effective law en-
forcement combined with respect for human rights is ever to be approached.
Fourth amendment law is unusual in a way that makes a radical restruc-
turing of it especially necessary. Unlike most areas of law, it is not law for
lawyers so much as it is law for police officers (a characteristic it shares with
188. Id. at 1491-98 (describing possibility of strict warrant requirement); see also Grano, Re-
thinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 603, 650 (1982)
(arguing that only exigent circumstances should justify warrantless search). This strict warrant
requirement rule would apply only to cases in which the search is based on probable cause. Thus,
Terry-frisks could still be conducted without a warrant. Searches incident to valid arrests should be
broken down into the frisk for weapons (no warrant required) and the search for evidence (warrant
required) components. See Bradley, supra note 15, at 1494.
189. See Bradley, supra note 15, at 1481-91 (describing "reasonableness" model). The Supreme
Court's current view that the fourth amendment requires a search warrant in every case subject to a
few well-delineated exceptions gains little support from either the language or the history of the
amendment. Id. at 1486 (arguing that language of fourth amendment does not emphasize primacy
of warrant requirement over reasonableness requirement).
190. Nardulli, Costs Revisited, supra note 175, at 231. Note that this is a success rate in cases in
which such motions were filed. Such suppression motions were filed in 8.8% of all cases. There is
some reason to discount this success rate, which does not square with previous findings as to the
impact of the exclusionary rule. As Professor Nardulli points out, for example, the overall convic-
tion rate in all cases was very low in Chicago (39.8%) compared to the jurisdictions he had previ-
ously studied (88%). Id. at 233. The granting of a motion to suppress thus simply may have been a
convenient way for the courts to dispose of a weak case.
191. As stated by Commander John Ryle of the Chicago Police Department: "[The exclusionary
rule] makes the police department more professional. It enforces appropriate standards of behavior.
Throughout this police department, the majority of cases are not hurt by the exclusionary rule."
Note, supra note 31, at 1016. But see Nardulli, Costs Revisited, supra note 175, at 231 (finding
motions to suppress physical evidence succeeding in 63.8% of all cases in Chicago).
192. See Table I, supra (15.7% of all cases decided for defendant and 10.3% of all cases decided
incorrectly for government).
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the Miranda branch of fifth amendment law). A group of people, the police,
untrained in the niceties of legal interpretation, are expected to apply this law
while at the same time pursuing the overriding goals of catching criminals
and protecting themselves and others from harm. While the Supreme Court
often has recognized the need for clear rules for the police to follow in iso-
lated cases, no Justice would claim seriously that the entire body of fourth
amendment law constitutes any kind of comprehensible mandate to the aver-
age police officer. Unlike the Miranda rules, which by their clarity and in-
flexibility generally inform the police what to do, current fourth amendment
law must be contemplated in advance by lawyers to be understood. Either of
my models would be more consistent with the goal of enforcing the fourth
amendment than is the current arrangement.
Admittedly, the two proposals suggested here are not faultless. The "rea-
sonableness" approach, by giving no guidelines, invites trial judges to put
themselves in the shoes of the police. It threatens to erode privacy interests
in some jurisdictions and effective law enforcement in others. Certainly, a
system providing clear, nationally uniform rules would be preferable. As this
study shows, however, the current system does not do this.
The "strict warrant" approach provides rules as well as any approach
could, while still leaving room for the police to act without a warrant in case
of an emergency. The problem with this approach is that it threatens effec-
tive law enforcement in close cases in which the police, erring on the side of
caution, attempt to secure a warrant and let the suspect slip away. Neverthe-
less, it is clear to me that far fewer criminals would be lost in this scenario
than currently are lost in the court system as a consequence of the inability of
police officers to follow the Supreme Court's fourth amendment rules.
In an effort to balance the interests of effective law enforcement and pro-
tection of human rights, the Court has disserved both. Unless a wholesale
restructuring of fourth amendment law occurs, the system will continue to
produce an unacceptably high volume of cases lost at every stage of the crim-
inal process, because of the inability of the police, the lawyers, and the courts
to follow the hopelessly complex body of fourth amendment law.
V. CONCLUSION
One cannot conclude definitively from a study of reported appellate deci-
sions whether the states in general, or a given state in particular, are enforc-
ing the fourth amendment. A state with a high quality police force and
conscientious trial courts, for example, would produce neither many appel-
late decisions favoring defendants nor many cases wrongly decided in favor
of the government. The prevalence of unreported decisions in some states
compounds the difficulties.
Despite the limitations of this study, it provides useful data for comparing
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a state to itself over time and states to each other at a given time. It answers
in the negative the question of whether Stone v. Powell has had an impact
and reveals that, in general, many states appear to be enforcing the fourth
amendment as conscientiously as possible, given the complexity of the law.
Some states have surpassed the Supreme Court by interpreting the search
and seizure provisions of their constitutions more broadly than the fourth
amendment has been interpreted in recent years.1 93 Nevertheless, in my
view, Georgia plainly, and possibly South Carolina and Arizona, are not en-
forcing the fourth amendment. Accordingly, the United States District
Courts in Georgia, if they agree with my view of the cases, should reassume
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction under the "full and fair" opportunity ex-
ception in Stone. Federal courts in those states with a preponderance of un-
reported opinions should conduct a full review of these unreported cases.
What of the states not studied? No doubt that there may be a few other
states-with the combination of a low percentage of cases decided in favor of
defendants and a high percentage of cases wrongly decided in favor of the
government (or a general refusal to issue reported opinions in fourth amend-
ment cases plus other evidence of noncompliance)-that they too can be said
not to be following fourth amendment standards. While a broad study such
as this one is difficult, a similar study of a single state in one year is not. It is
not too much to expect that ambitious law student authors or public defend-
ers in Florida, Texas, or Pennsylvania, let alone Wyoming or Montana,
might undertake to examine the decisions in their state for one or two years,
thereby possibly providing grounds for a defense attorney to raise this issue
in the federal district courts of that state.
If the Supreme Court insists on having intricate fourth amendment rules,
it must take appropriate steps to ensure that the states are enforcing them.
To declare such rules and then wink at a consistent flouting of them by a
state's courts is not a sensible way to govern. 194
193. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (identifying states whose search and seizure pro-
tections exceed those currently required by fourth amendment).
194. The irrationality of the Supreme Court's approach is apparent as far away as Australia:
An accused person cannot invoke the [exclusionary] rule if the evidence was obtained in
breach of another's rights. The rule does not apply to breaches by a private individual
rather than a state official. It does not apply so as to prevent the presentation of illegally
obtained evidence to a federal grand jury. And the rule does not apply where the evidence
is admitted not on the issue of the accused's guilt but on some collateral issue such as his
credibility as a witness. This kind of narrow distinction between evidence proving guilt
and evidence proving that an accused who says he is not guilty is not worthy of belief as a
witness tends to bring the law and lawyers into contempt.
AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION REPORT No. 2, at 39 (In-
terim 1975).
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